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Both preservice and seasoned teachers experience a considerable gap between
theory and prescriptions for teaching and their day-to-day practice. We concep-
tualize this gap in terms of the difference between descriptions of practice and
practice itself. Descriptions cannot include the tacit understanding against which
specific acts of teaching become meaningful; thus, they are inherently out of syn-
chrony with practice. We illustrate how Bourdieu’s notion of habitus (a set of
dispositions) accounts for appropriate actions in situations where there is no “time
out” for deliberation and how coteaching can support preservice teachers’
development of this habitus.
Les étudiants-maîtres comme les enseignants chevronnés ressentent l’écart
considérable entre la théorie et les règles de l’enseignement et leur pratique
quotidienne. Les auteurs conceptualisent cet écart en termes de différence entre
les descriptions de la pratique et la pratique elle-même. Les descriptions ne
peuvent inclure la compréhension tacite par rapport à laquelle des activités pré-
cises d’enseignement prennent un sens; aussi ces descriptions en elles-mêmes ne
concordent pas avec la pratique. Les auteurs illustrent comment la notion d’habitus
de Bourdieu (un ensemble de dispositions) explique la pertinence des actions
effectuées dans des situations où il n’y a pas de temps pour délibérer et comment
le coenseignement peut favoriser de développement de cet habitus chez les
stagiaires.
It was hard, for I remember at the university you’re hearing all these ways and
methods . . . these idealistic ways. When you actually get out there it’s different,
putting it into actions . . . I don’t know what anybody else did, but I was sort of
stumbling through things myself . . . I know that in September it was a real struggle
and a real battle. (Nadine, 28 January 1998)1
Such comments from preservice teachers are familiar, even expected. And
despite our empathy, we recognize Nadine’s experience as constituting
much of the history and lore of teachers’ first professional experiences. Part
of her frustration stems from experiencing the rift between the theoretical
discourse of the university and the reality and demands of the classroom.
We maintain that this division between theoretical accounts of technique
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and practice can be characterized in terms of temporality and context. We
further argue for a praxeology (praxis, action, and logos, talk, speech) of
teaching rather than a theory of teaching practice, and we propose
coteaching for its development and as a model for inservice and preservice
teacher development, evaluation, and research. Vignettes drawn from the
experiences of preservice teachers with whom we have worked and from
our own classroom experiences illustrate the gap between technique and
practice. The vignettes also illustrate the manner in which coteaching can
help to bridge this division through the development of an appropriate
habitus, a system of structured and structuring dispositions that helps one
to act appropriately in diverse contexts.
METHODS AND IDEALISTIC WAYS
Teacher education programs generally include courses on methods of
teaching. Underlying many of these courses is the presupposition that
teaching can be described, and therefore explained, as a set of techniques
that are then offered to university students as “methods”:
Empirical and theoretical research in cognitive psychology make possible the con-
struction of theoretical models [of instructional strategies], on which predictions
can be based. The application of a model of [student] understanding of physical
phenomena leads to detailed specification of a strategy for beginning physics
instruction which can be expected to produce desired changes in students.
(Champagne, Klopfer, & Gunstone, 1982, p. 46)
So represented, teaching is a matter of identifying the appropriate stra-
tegies and assembling them into a (lesson) plan to be employed in the
classroom. Such rationalist views of teaching continue to pervade the field:
Knowledge of teaching is described as declarative and procedural, located
exclusively in the mind (Clermont, Borko, & Krajcik, 1994) and called up
by talking about practice (Copeland, Birmingham, DeMeulle, D’Emidio-
Caston, & Natal, 1994). It is no surprise that university teacher education
classrooms continue to be filled with talk about strategies, techniques, and
skills. Yet, despite extensive research on teaching and efforts to make the
university education of teachers more relevant to their daily experience,
discontinuities persist between university discourses about teaching and
the practice of teaching (Liston & Zeichner, 1991; Roth, Masciotra, & Boyd,
1999; Tom, 1997; van Manen, 1990, 1995). This invites the question why the
rift between descriptions of teaching practice and enacted teaching practice
continues to exist.
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One answer is that practice becomes problematic when work is thought
to be knowable in the abstract. The problem lies in the contingent and
extemporaneous features of practice, neither of which are captured in the
decontextualized and detemporalized descriptions in theories of practice
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992). This shortcoming, in turn, may lead to an
emphasis on technique rather than actual practice, the difference being that
technique is removed from context whereas practice demands consid-
eration of the unfolding time and context in which action takes place (Orr,
1998).
DESCRIPTIONS AND PRESCRIPTIONS
Theoretical discourse about practice in teaching, business, and adminis-
tration alike implies that it can be viably described in abstract sets of
techniques to be considered, changed, deployed, taught, and learned in-
dependently of the contingent and temporal constraints of situated practice
(Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992; Hargreaves, 1994; Orr, 1998). For example,
CONTROL THE TIME AND PLACE FOR DEALING WITH OFF-TASK BEHAVIOR:
You are more likely to achieve a productive interchange about preventing recur-
rences of off-task behaviors in a private conference with a student than you will
when both of you are worried about others in the vicinity. Do not make the mistake
of making a major issue out of one student’s off-task behavior in front of other
students in order to exhibit the undesirability of the off-task behavior. (Cangelosi,
1993, pp. 207–208)
Such recommendations for action are typical in teacher education classes.
However, students as individuals and collectives are dynamic entities.
Therefore what teachers’ actions look like is a very different thing from
their description a posteriori as embodying such prescriptions. Consider the
recent experiences of Cam, Nadine, and Ken.
Cam, a student in a master’s-level urban teacher education program,
came to school with a well-prepared lesson plan. However, the lesson plan
could not anticipate the contingencies that would arise at the moment Cam
was to teach his lesson.
I tried to introduce the lab, move the desks, get them into groups, and get them
started on the lab. But no one would go with me. I had probably 5 or 6 kids out
of the 25 in the class actually interested in doing what I wanted them to do. They
were unruly, totally disrespectful, loud, and obnoxious. Everything I wanted to do
took about 3 times as long as I wanted it to. When I finally got around to handing
out the materials and getting them started, it was 10:15, 19 minutes left in the period
and they hadn’t even started the experiments yet! (Cam, 4 November 1998)
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The lesson did not unfold as planned. The plan did not and could not
embody the contingencies of the moment, the interactions that are the
grounds for and lead to the construction of “teacher” and “student.” Cam
experienced a difference between what he expected and the actual tra-
jectory as the lesson took unexpected turns in response to the interactions
of people with each other and their setting. Nor did any of the techniques
that Cam was familiar with work in the here and now of this classroom.
Cam’s experience illustrates a problem created by the gap between theory
and practice — plans and techniques are abstract representations that do
not embody the temporality of lived experience, a temporality always
enacted in and as part of praxis.
During a four-month study in Nadine’s classroom (Roth & Boyd, 1999),
there were repeated instances when students such as Tory questioned her
request that he leave the classroom so that she could deal with him away
from the other students: “Why do I have to leave? I haven’t done any-
thing.” Although the request worked with some students, it did not always
work with Tory. As she said in our opening quotation, she was stumbling
through the first few months of her student teaching, unable to deal
satisfactorily with important aspects of teaching such as discipline and
productive questioning.
In the abstract, when the unfolding events left her time to reflect, Nadine
knew a number of techniques to deal with discipline problems: Take the
student outside the classroom and talk to him/her without an audience
present, write the name of the misbehaving student on the chalkboard with
action to be taken after class, talk quietly to the student and attempt to
dissolve the issue, and continue the discussion in the forum selected by the
student. However, as Nadine found out, knowing these techniques only in
the abstract does not enable one to act appropriately in a particular situa-
tion, for in praxis, there is no or little time for deliberation. Her interactions
with Tory always seemed to lead to similar problems. Furthermore, a
technique that worked one day did not always work.
Well, I think, I think that it’s just the here and now. And, I mean, it’s easy to think of,
well, somebody says this to me, then I follow this and this and this. But every
situation is so different and every student is so different. (Nadine, 24 April 1998)
Here, Nadine recognized the context-dependent quality of instructions:
“Every situation is so different and every student is so different” that it is
uncertain how an instruction (“[a more experienced teacher] says this to
me”) can be used in a particular situation. The problem does not lie with
poor instructions but with the ontological differences between instructions
and situated actions (Suchman, 1987). Thus, the significance of instructions
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must be discovered with reference to particular circumstances. The spe-
cifics of the relation between the instruction and the situation have to be
worked out then and there.
At this point, it may be tempting to suggest that the experiences of both
Cam and Nadine simply show their inexperience — all new teachers suffer
through such events. Although this may be true, we suggest that the lack
of congruency between instructions and practice remains problematic
throughout a teacher’s career. Consider Ken, who is now teaching a science
class in the Opportunity cluster of an urban school with an almost exclu-
sively African-American clientele (Roth & Tobin, in press; Tobin, Seiler, &
Smith, 1999). Many students in Opportunity have histories of academic
failure, have criminal records, are teenaged mothers, or attend school spor-
adically. Despite his 35 years of teaching experience and generous advice
to his student teacher, Cam, when Ken began teaching in Opportunity, he
generally failed to teach the science he had planned.
During an end of topic test, I had occasion to speak privately to about four students
because they were speaking at a volume that was not only audible but also quite
distracting to others in the class. When I spoke quietly to Ramon, his public re-
sponse to me was that he had finished [the test] and it therefore was acceptable for
him to talk to others, exchange papers, and relax. At that point I had several
options. I could speak to him outside, try to continue the discussion quietly, or
continue the conversation in the forum he had selected. Each option is fraught with
clear problems. If I ask him to step outside and he refuses to do so, then the incident
has been escalated to a degree that will result in either detention or suspension. It
also leads to confrontation. If I speak quietly to him and appeal to his sense of
reason and good citizenship, it moves the responsibility back to him to be decent
and not distract others. However, his actions prior to my speaking to him suggest
that he is unlikely to agree to interact privately. He wants to win any debate, and
he needs a jury of peers to have a chance. The option of having the discussion at a
level that is loud enough for all to hear is unacceptable because it disrupts everyone
from their work and gives others like Ramon a chance to join the exchange. A final
alternative is to walk away from Ramon and ignore his efforts to be disruptive. This
alternative only forestalls [sic] the inevitable next occurrence of unacceptable
behavior. (Ken, 1 March 1999)
In Ken’s experience, speaking quietly with a student normally made it
possible for him to negotiate with the student what to do next. The situa-
tion was different in this science class: What normally worked even with-
out having to objectify the situation and next move did not work here.
Thus when Ken asked Ramon to step outside and Ramon refused, Ken was
forced to deal with a situation Cangelosi (1993) explicitly suggests avoid-
ing. Rather than having an opportunity to negotiate, he was forced to
consider his next move and, in this, get even further out of step with the
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unfolding events. Although his objectification of the experience and his
consideration of his options may have appeared to fly by, the necessary
detachment and time were sufficient for Ken to “lose touch” with the
situation (Masciotra, Ackerman, & Roth, in press; Masciotra & Roth, 1999;
Roth & Lawless, 2000). Such detachment makes “reflection-in-action”
impossible (Eraut, 1995), an important reason to introduce the notion
of Spielraum, room to maneuver without reflection (Roth, Lawless, &
Masciotra, in press).
All too often, teaching methods manuals are based on the assumption
that there are simple a priori relations between descriptions of practice and
actual practice. When actual teaching does not look like the description,
supervisors, administrators, students, parents, or peers blame the teacher.
The inherent gap between description and praxis is not acknowledged.
Yet readers will certainly have had experience with the difference between
reading instructions (e.g., a cookbook, a software manual, programming
instructions for a VCR, or directions for assembling furniture) and working
out what the instructions seem to describe. So it is in teaching: Teachers
find the connections between directives and practice through experience.
For this reason, descriptions often break down under the pressure of
context and time. Techniques are partial and inadequate descriptions
extracted for purposes of communication (Bourdieu, 1980), and excellence
and masterful practice cannot be based on them.
Some ethnomethodologists have taken an interest in understanding the
relation between practice and descriptions of it, particularly the relation-
ship  between instructions and what instruction-followers actually do (e.g.,
Amerine & Bilmes, 1990; Bjelíc, 1992; Bjelíc & Lynch, 1992; Law & Lynch,
1990; Sharrock & Button, 1991; Suchman, 1987). Research shows that a
motivated and competent reader will almost always arrive at definite con-
clusions about what instructions say even though the instructions may be
only marginally adequate in providing what is needed to determine their
meaning and even though there are no specifiable methods for reading
instructions. Instruction-followers will, then and there, in the here and now
of the particular situation, contrive ways of dealing with the seeming
discontinuity. But to do so, they have to draw on their understanding of the
possible and actual courses of actions and their outcomes. To know what
teaching techniques “really” mean, then, teachers need to read them using
their familiarity with circumstances in which such techniques are ap-
plicable. This is not a simple matter, as our examples from Ken’s, Cam’s,
and Nadine’s teaching show. Even an experienced teacher may not be fa-
miliar with the particulars of some settings: Ken had not previously taught
in an urban school and therefore was not familiar with the circumstances
in which his techniques describe appropriate actions. His experience is not
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unique (Bullough & Baughman, 1997). Teachers attempting to employ a
particular technique need to understand not only how the technique works
but also how it works in a particular situation and what really does rather
than what conceivably may happen.
TEMPORALITY OF PRACTICE
People doing something seldom deliberately articulate everything they do
and every aspect of their context. People seldom place their feet or choose
nouns, verbs, and adjectives that they arrange in a proper sequence: They
simply walk or talk. In many ways, we understand the world too well,
much as the proverbial fish “understand” the water they inhabit: It has
become so much part of their existence that it has become transparent
(invisible). When real-time activities are objectified, they lose their trans-
parent and temporal character. Practitioners work without objectifying
precisely because they find themselves in the situation; they are part of the
setting they inhabit “like a habit [clothing] or familiar habitat” (Bourdieu,
1997, p. 170, our translation). Thus, everyday praxis — teaching, repairing
photocopiers, doing research, cooking, or gardening — is better described
in terms of transparent coping than in terms of deliberate action (Dreyfus,
1991). The keyboards we used to write this article were transparent for the
activity of writing; we were concerned with, for example, ideas, text, and
choice of words. Keyboards emerge from the background into conscious-
ness only in cases of breakdown or a change in their normal way of func-
tioning or when we describe the activity of typing. In teaching, transparent
coping allows the teacher to relate to students instead of focusing on the
mechanics of implementing classroom management routines.
Temporality is not captured in existing theories of practice (Agre, 1997;
Bourdieu, 1997) or teaching manuals. Practice unfolds in time, irreversibly,
with its own rhythm, tempo, and directionality. The experience of practice
is therefore temporally asymmetrical in that it can be known only from its
beginning to the present, not in its completion. This temporality is con-
stitutive of practice. However, it is destroyed by the objectifying of the
researcher, for to be knowable, the practice has to be complete so that it
can be lifted from the totality of experience. But as complete entities, the
described practices and techniques have lost not only the context from
which they were lifted but also their temporal aspect. In this “freezing”
(Collins, 1990), polymorphic (multiple uses) and polythetic (multiple mean-
ings) actions are converted into monomorphic and monothetic actions, that
is, into techniques (Berg, 1998; Bourdieu, 1980). The freezing is not prob-
lematic in itself, but it is problematic when texts conflate and therefore
confound the frozen images of practice with practice itself. Yet preservice
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and experienced teachers alike often begin with these and similar des-
criptions of teaching only to be surprised that in their day-to-day praxis
things often do not work out as expected. As Nadine discovered, there is
a difference between the description of practice and the practice itself.
This still leaves unanswered the question, “How do teachers come to act
appropriately despite doing so contingently and extemporaneously?” With
Bourdieu (1980) we answer, “By developing habitus.”
HABITUS
Habitus is best understood as a set of dispositions that structure actions,
perceptions, and expectations (Bourdieu, 1980). It stands in a dialectical
relation to its material and social setting; it embodies the structures of this
setting and constitutes a set of structured, structuring dispositions. From
a phenomenological and Critical Psychological perspective, the experience
of being-together-with others and things in the world predates experience
of Self (Holzkamp, 1983; Ricœur, 1992). Each individual comes to embody
habitus through inclusion in a world always and already structured by the
culture into which he is born (Heidegger, 1996). Habitus works in experi-
ence as an open system of dispositions that constantly adapts to produce
practices that are appropriate in their context.
Habitus can be viewed as a modus operandi that functions in praxis
according to norms that are not explicit principles. It is a “feel for the
game” that allows practitioners to do what they do in a situation and at the
right moment without the need to make thematic what has to be done. This
feel, characteristic of what Bourdieu (1980) calls the practical sense (sens
pratique), articulates the sense (Sinn) that constitutes the background
necessary to anything resembling cognition. It makes unnecessary knowl-
edge of an explicit rule for a practice. By analogy, native speakers can speak
and write correctly without being well versed in (able to state the rules of)
grammar, the explicit rules that govern their own tongue. Competent
practice does not require explicit theoretical knowledge.
Habitus, though the prevalent modality of action associated with the
experience of being-in-the-world, does not rule out other modalities. It
may be accompanied by a strategic calculation of costs and benefits and,
therefore, by an evaluation of objectified choices (Bourdieu & Wacquant,
1992). Deliberation may take over when habitus breaks down (for example,
in a novel setting) or when habitus generates inappropriate actions, the
routine adjustment of actions and context has been disrupted, or ap-
propriate actions are no longer ready-to-hand. However, deliberation is
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associated with the processing of representations, tokens of objectified
experiences. This modality of action, as artificial intelligence and cognitive
science researchers have shown, takes much longer than the epistemic
actions and embodied computation of habitus (Kirsh & Maglio, 1994).
Because deliberation takes time, the resulting action will necessarily be too
late, because the world does not stop (Agre, 1997).
Although habitus is generally formed implicitly, it can be transformed
by reflection on action “via socio-analysis, i.e., via an awakening of
consciousness and a form of ‘self-work’ that enables the individual to get
a handle on his or her dispositions” (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 133).
The efficacy of the analysis depends on the existing habitus and the con-
ditions. Thus, Ken, who engages in analyses of his teaching and reflection
on his and other teachers’ practices in Opportunity, may be able to re-
structure his habitus so that he can teach successfully in this school. How-
ever, such “self-work” does not come easily to even the best intentioned
and most dedicated. As well, the analysis itself can never occur in a
moment of action, for it requires time. Furthermore, inherent in abstraction
is the loss of the indexical ground against which the actions have occurred
and their meaning. Descriptions no longer include the specifics of the
situation and in particular lack what made the actions meaningful in the
first place.
Analysis requires freezing the activity. Descriptions are necessarily static
and lead to the specification of techniques; in turn, practice gets presented
as assemblies of techniques to be used in deliberation, the results of which
are implemented. Implementation is problematic in a dual way. First,
because descriptions and techniques are abstracted, converted from the
dynamic and continuous world into the digital form of linguistic repre-
sentation (e.g., Hutchins, 1993),2 it is always questionable whether they can
be re-grounded in the context in which they are supposed to be imple-
mented. Second, deliberation prior to implementation requires internal
time while external time continues (Agre, 1997).
Habitus embodies the structures of the world; it fits the world because
of its structural coupling (Davis, 1996), an analog correspondence of agent
and world. Deliberation associated with representation, logical consi-
deration, and reflection not only is partitioned off from the world (in the
mind) but also is different in kind from the world and has its own time
(Agre, 1997). Although abstraction allows imaginative freedom, it creates
phenomena that have little or no necessary relationship to physical space
and time. In contrast, the analog computing of habitus arises from the
dynamic and coupled relation between individual and world, leading to
continuous updating and synchrony between the two.
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COTEACHING AS BEING-TOGETHER-WITH
Implementing techniques on one’s own — having to develop habitus with-
out the benefit of seeing it in action, that is, from the experience of being-
together-with another — frequently involves painstaking and frustrating
trial and error.
I mean for me, as [for] classroom control, it has just all been trial and error, that is,
learning as I went along, finding what works or what doesn’t work. I felt . . . just
thrown into it right away. I think [my cooperating teacher] just wanted to throw me
in there and have me figure out what worked and what didn’t work. I find that
frustrating, that I didn’t have any modelling, because I know there’s other ways, I
know there’s other things out there, and I know that it works, but I haven’t seen it.
(Nadine, 14 March 1998)
Nadine was describing the protracted learning process by which she
came to achieve classroom control. There was no simple, linear, direct way
she could implement the abstract techniques that she had learned in a
course. Ken had similar moments when he felt left alone, sometimes aban-
doned, by the regular teacher, Mr. Spiegel, who sat at the back of the class-
room. Whereas Mr. Spiegel’s experience of teaching in this school (though
short) could have been a considerable resource for dealing with some of
Ken’s problems, his withdrawal forced Ken to develop his own expertise.
In response to the problems experienced by preservice teachers and on
the basis of our experience of teachers learning from teachers as they co-
participate in praxis, we have developed coteaching. Coteaching is a mode
of teaching grounded in being-together-with as the fundamental condi-
tion of existence (Roth, 1998a, 1998b; Roth & Boyd, 1999; Roth, Masciotra,
& Boyd, 1999; Roth & Tobin, in press). In coteaching, two practitioners
share responsibility for teaching a class. They plan lessons together and
work together in the classroom rather than splitting activities as often
happens in team teaching. Coteaching does not preclude one person’s
taking a greater and more central role in some situations (e.g., during
planning or questioning).
Coteaching works because habitus generates practices only in relation to
particulars; as with other practices (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992), there is
no better way to experience teaching than doing the real thing together
with another practitioner. The benefits of coteaching fundamentally arise
from being-together-with: People learn and harmonize their practices
without having to make their learning thematic.
It is the objective homogenizing of group or class habitus resulting from the
homogeneity of conditions of existence that enables practices to be objectively
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harmonized without any strategic calculation or conscious reference to a norm, and
to be mutually adjusted in the absence of any direct interaction or, a fortiori, explicit
coordination. (Bourdieu, 1980, p. 98, our translation, italics in the original)
In quoting Bourdieu, we do not suggest that reflective practice should be
abandoned but that an additional mode of learning is neglected if we focus
only on reflection. Being-together-with, which underlies non-thematic
learning and coordination of practices, allows co-participants to experience
events under the same temporality, openness towards the future, and
constraints to act without the leisure of theoretical (timeless) reflection.
Practitioners experience synchrony between themselves and with the class.
Under certain conditions, two experienced practitioners can conduct les-
sons, improvise, and exchange roles with a feel for the implicit intention of
the other and without objectifying the events and communicating about
them (Roth, 1998b; Roth & Tobin, in press).
If the learner is to acquire habitus without the tinkering required in trial
and error, teaching a practice (métier, craft, trade) must be different from
teaching propositional knowledge.
A number of modes of thinking and action, and oftentimes the most vital ones, are
transmitted from practice to practice, through total and practical modes of trans-
mission founded upon the direct and lasting contact between the one who teaches
and the one who learns (“Do as I do”). (Bourdieu & Wacquant, 1992, p. 223)
This description is viable for learning not only material practices such as
those of butchers and midwives (Lave & Wenger, 1991) but also the
conceptual and methodological practices of academic researchers (Bour-
dieu, 1997; Roth & McGinn, 1998), and it is especially appropriate for
learning to teach (Roth, 1998b).
In seven studies we conducted, all the teachers who engaged in co-
teaching emphasized the amount they learned. Even experienced teachers
made comments such as “I don’t think three university courses could
have given me what [coteaching] gave me in these two months” and “This
experience has changed my thinking about this unit [although] I wrote it,
tested it, and had done workshops with teachers on it for the past three
years.” In our research, student teachers particularly benefitted from
working with a more experienced practitioner:
Yes, that was helpful for me too, to listen to your questions and hear your questions
then and there, as it happened, and then to think about how it related to the
demonstration and where you were trying to go with that question. (Nadine, 23
March 1998)
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We suggest coteaching not only for preservice and inservice teachers but
also as a different way of conceptualizing the supervision and evaluation
of teaching (Roth & Tobin, in press). Supervisors and evaluators who are
also absorbed in the process of teaching get an inside perspective on the
eventualities and potentialities in this particular classroom. During the
moments when the other has taken the lead, coteaching allows reflection
on the other’s actions. Since this experience of being-together-with can be
objectified later, the participants collectively elaborate an evaluation. Thus,
Ken, who at first provided his student teachers with advice on what and
how to teach, could develop a sense of what it meant to teach in the here-
and-now of this class only by working side-by-side with a student teacher
or with the regular teacher. Furthermore, all our studies show that co-
teaching provides a rich ground for developing a professional discourse,
a praxeology (understood as talk about practice) associated with an ever-
increasing understanding of practice out of practice (Tobin, Roth, &
Zimmermann, in press). Praxeology is grounded in a hermeneutic phenom-
enology designed to develop understanding through rigorous explanation-
seeking enquiry but always remaining in and enveloped by the situated
understanding of day-to-day praxis (Roth & Tobin, in press). Thus, co-
teaching provides promise for closing the gap between theory and practice
in that it objectifies practice out of practice but is always attached to
practice.
CODA
In this article, we have conceptualized the theory-practice gap in terms of
the difference between objectifying descriptions of practice and temporally
unfolding practice itself. Teachers may automatically be in trouble, then,
when they draw on prescriptions encapsulated in “teaching techniques,”
for these prescriptions do not come with background, the practical sense
necessary for appropriately putting them into action. Furthermore, the ob-
jectification of one’s situation needed to deliberate among alternative
techniques takes time and puts one out of touch with unfolding events.
Thus, because there is no “time out” in practice, teaching (like many other
practices) relies on habitus to generate appropriate actions. Our work
suggests that coteaching is an excellent context in which to develop and
adapt preservice and experienced teachers’ habitus. Coteaching also pro-
vides a ground for developing habitus through a praxeology in which we
can embed Bourdieu’s socio-analysis.
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NOTES
1. All names have been changed to ensure the anonymity of participants.
2. Hutchins (1993) discusses the difference between the analog form of cognition
in the experience-based navigation of the Puluwat Islanders (Micronesia) and the
digital form of cognition (tools, skills) in Western navigation. Whereas analog
cognition requires being part of the world, structurally coupled, to complete the
practice of navigation, digital Western navigation can operate in the abstract.
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